Ocean Harbor Class Certification Reversed, Remanded

Another blow was just dealt to MSP Recovery. On September 26, 2018, the Third District Court of Appeal for the State of Florida reversed and remanded the class action certification that had gained so much attention when it was granted last year.

This case has its genesis with MSPA Claims 1, LLC, a subsidiary of MSP Recovery acting on behalf of Florida Healthcare Plus, Inc., a now defunct Medicare Advantage Organization (MAO), and other similarly situated entities. MSPA filed a class action against Ocean Harbor Casualty Insurance Company for failure to reimburse medical bills. MSPA sought double damages via the Medicare Secondary Payer Act’s private cause of action, 42 U.S.C. § 1395Y(b)(3)(A). MSPA contended that class action was appropriate as some or all of the thirty-seven (37) MAOs in Florida might be in a similar situation. The trial court determined that common issues existed because the Plaintiffs’ right to reimbursement was “automatic,” given that a payment was made on behalf of a Medicare enrollee who was also insured by the Defendant and that such payment was not reimbursed.

In order to understand the Appeal Court’s ruling, the underlying class certification must be first examined. According to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a), the prerequisites to class certification are numerosity, commonalty, typicality and adequate representation, in additional to the satisfaction of other requirements under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b). Under 1.220(b), one of three subsections must be satisfied. The subsections are: (b)(1) prosecution of individual actions for members of the class creates a risk of inconsistent adjudications and incompatible standards of conduct; (b)(2) relief sought by the class is injunctive or declaratory in nature, rather than predominantly monetary damages, or (b)(3) that common issues of law or fact predominate over issues affecting only individual class members, and thus the class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.  The trial court certified this class based on subsection (b)(3), referencing Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Diamond, “In a (b)(3) class action, not all issues of fact and law are common, but common issues predominate over individual issues.” 140 So. 3d 1095-96 (Fla. 3d DVA 2014) (citing Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3)).

The Appeal Court reconsidered predominance under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3), stating “the appropriateness of the class certification turns largely on whether issues common to the class will predominate.” The Appeal Court noted that this matter was an “intersection” of Florida class action law, Medicare Secondary Payer law and Florida no-fault insurance law. In exploring the obligation to reimburse Medicare under the MSP Act and also Florida no-fault insurance law, the Court aptly examined not only that a payment was made by Medicare, but also whether Ocean Harbor was required to make the payment in the first place. Through this exercise, the Appeal Court questioned the “automatic” requirement to reimburse Medicare simply due to a demonstrated responsibility to make a payment, as the MSP does not eliminate the terms and conditions of the state no-fault law. Specifically, the Court referenced 42 C.F.R Section 411.51, stating “Medicare does not pay until the Beneficiary has exhausted his or her remedies under no-fault insurance” (emphasis added). In blending the federal Medicare law with the state no-fault law, the Court first observed that the MSP’s private cause of action does not arise until a payment could reasonably be expected to be made under no-fault insurance. In turn, the Court stated that MSPA must prove that not only was a proper conditional payment made, but that Ocean Harbor was required to make the payment in the first place under the state no-fault law.

MSPA relied upon the holdings in In re: Avandia Marketing[1], and Humana Medical Plan v. Western Heritage Ins[2], two predominant circuit court cases conferring the private cause of action on the Plaintiff(s). In each of these two cases, the responsibility to make a payment was in reference to the primary plan’s pre-existing settlement of a claim relating to the tort from which the medical bills arose. The Appeal Court distinguished the facts of Ocean Harbor from these two landmark cases, in that no pre-existing settlement was being referenced as creating a responsibility for payment. Rather, the demonstrated responsibility was to be established “by other means,” thereby cancelling these cases out as precedent, bringing this matter within the MSP Recovery LLC v. Allstate[3] tutelage. In Allstate, the 11^th Circuit held that even without a settlement, a demonstrated responsibility for payment could be established through proof of the primary plan’s contractual obligation to make a payment. The burden of proving this is on the Plaintiff.

According to Florida no-fault law, there are exclusions from the obligation to make payments, and also necessary procedures that if not followed, are grounds to decline payment. The Appeal Court observed that “payment under Florida no-fault law proceeds on a factually intensive bill-by-bill and case-by-case basis,” and that MSPA would be required to prove the Defendant was required to pay each particular bill. Ocean Harbor would likewise be permitted to raise defenses regarding each particular bill, thus resulting in a series of mini-trials to determine whether payment is required under Florida no-fault law. The Appeal Court stated in its conclusion “Proof that certain medical bills paid by MSPA’s alleged assignor should have been paid by Ocean Harbor as a primary payer will not establish that other medical bills paid by a different MAO should also have been paid by Ocean Harbor as a primary payer.” Accordingly, a finding of predominance was precluded, rendering the case inappropriate for class action certification. As such, the class certification was reversed and the case remanded.

Practitioner’s Note: This Court delves into interesting territory in its determination that common issues of law or fact do not predominate over issues affecting only individual class members if there is a question about whether payment of each individual bill was ever required to begin with. A similar analysis can be applied as to whether it is appropriate to file suit for Medicare conditional payment reimbursement when each individual Medicare conditional payment may not be “ripe” for reimbursement. Like Florida no-fault law, there are processes and procedures in obtaining Medicare conditional payment information, as well as for making timely reimbursement. There are defenses. There is a statute of limitations. There are reasons why payments made by Medicare may be proper payments rather than conditional payments. This decision touches on the concept of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and references the SMART Act (Strengthening Medicare and Repaying Taxpayers Act of 2012), which provides primary payers an appeal process for Medicare conditional payment matters.  Many of the various court rulings in MAO litigation focus on demonstrated responsibility for reimbursement without considering whether it is actually timely or appropriate to reimburse Medicare. If MAOs wish to assert the same rights of reimbursements as traditional Medicare Parts A and B under the MSP laws, it would stand to reason that the same processes and procedures would apply. In day-to-day practice, the mere existence of Medicare conditional payments does not necessarily trigger the obligation to reimburse.

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[1] In re: Avandia Marketing, 685 F.3d 353, (3^rd Cir. 2012)

[2] Humana Medical Plan v. Western Heritage Ins, 832 F.3d 1229, (11^th Cir. 2016)

[3] MSP Recovery, LLC v. Allstate Insurance Company, 853 F. 3d 1351 (11^th Cir. 2016)